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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal 
corporation of the State of 
Utah, 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
vs. 
RAYMOND S. SHUEY, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 14819 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is an appeal from an Order of the District Court of 
the Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County, 
denying plaintiff the use of the presumption rule, i.e., 
that it may be presumed or inferred the registered owner of 
a vehicle, parked in violation of a parking regulation, 
was the person committing the violation. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT 
Upon stipulated facts the lower court•found the 
defendant not guilty and denied plaintiff the use of the 
presumption rule. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant is the registered owner of a Porsche vehicle, 
license No. KCC 789 and an Opal, license No. JJB 704. During 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1974 and 1975 there were 14 parking tickets for meter 
violations issued against these vehicles by Salt Lake City 
Police Meter Maids. All tickets were issued within the 
corporate limits of Salt Lake City. Defendant was served 
with complaint, legally issued, and a set of facts were 
stipulated to by the respective counsel. The stipulated 
facts were as outlined above, with the addition that 
Section 156 of the Salt Lake City Traffic Code is a duly 
enacted ordinance, regulating parking meter violations. 
The facts were so stipulated and the case presented to the 
court for the determination as to wheth.er the presumption 
rule should be applied. 
ARGUMENT 
THERE IS A COMMON LAW PRESUMPTION RULE 
THAT THE OWNER OF A MOTOR VEHICLE WAS 
OPERATING IT AT THE TIME IT WAS PARKED 
IN VIOLATION OF A PARKING REGULATION. 
Because there is peculiar difficulties as to proof of 
the person who actually parked a motor vehicle at the time 
a violation occurred, courts have established a presumption 
rule of evidence. This rule is that it may be presumed or 
inferred that the owner of a motor vehicle 'was operating it 
at the time it was parked in violation of a parking regula-
tion. Parking violations are of a peculiar sort. When 
vehicles are parked and left unattended, there is generally 
no one present to be arrested. It is unreasonable to require 
-2-
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a police officer to remain until the driver returns or to 
have one stationed at each parking space (or even a group 
of parking spaces) to watch who parks the vehicles therein. 
The only remaining alternatives are to impound vehicles 
in violation or to toss out parking regulations entirely. 
The impounding of vehicles is no practical solution to 
the problem because a city could not keep on hand sufficient 
tow trucks to tow away the vehicles in violation. The 
expense thereof would be prohibitive and it would also be 
very distruptive of traffic movement, the very thing parking 
regulations are designed to relieve. One could envision 
500 tow trucks in the downtown area of Salt Lake City towing 
one vehicle after another to an impound lot. Shoppers and 
persons on business could not even get through the streets, 
let alone find a parking spot. 
The only logical and reasonable alternative is a pre-
sumption or inference. A presumption of this type arises 
from commonly accepted experienced of mankind and inferences 
which reasonable men might draw from such experience. 
Meares v. Meares, 256 Ala. 596, 56 So.2d 661 (1952); Indian-
apolis v. Keeley, 167 Ind. 516, 79 N.E. 499 (1906). When 
there is uniform experience concerning the connection 
between one fact that is proved and the one to be inferred, 
the unproven fact may be presumed. Greer v. U.S., 245 U.S. 
-3-
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559, 62 L.ed. 469, 38 S.Ct. 209 (1918). 
If there is a rational connection between the fact 
proved and the fact to be presumed, the court may apply 
the presumption rule, i.e., on the basis of human exper-
ience it is the probable or natural explanation of the 
fact. Manning v. John Hancock Mut. L. Ins. Co., 100 u.s. 
693, 25 L.ed. 761 (1880); Engel v. United Traction co., 
203 N.Y. 321, 96 N.E. 731 (1911). 
In considering the cons ti tutionali ty of an inference, 
the United States Supreme Court has applied a variety of 
tests to evaluate such inference. That court has determined 
that there must be a rational connection between the fact 
proved and the fact presumed. Tot v. U.S., 319 U.S. 463, 
467, 63 S.Ct. 1241, 87 L.ed. 1519 (1943). The presumed 
fact must be more likely than not to flow from the proved 
fact. Leary v. U.S., 395 U.S. 6, 36, 89 S.Ct. 1532, 23 L.ed. 
2d 57 (1969). 
It is human experience that it is more likely than not 
that the owner of a vehicle is the one who parked a vehicle 
when a violation occurred. Regarding the rational connection 
between ownership and operation of a vehicle and the relative 
convenience of producing evidence of the facts, the Supreme 
Court of Michigan in People v. Kayne, 286 Mich. 571, 282 N.li. 
248 (1938), referred to a random sampling taken on two 
-4-
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different dates where it was found that in 87,6% of the 
cases where vehicles had been illegally parked, the owner 
of such vehicle was the one cornrnitting the violation. In 
8% of the cases the violation was cornrnitted by an immediate 
member of the owner's family. They found that in only 
4.4% of the cases surveyed that the violation was cornrnitted 
by some person other than the owner or an immediate member 
of his family. 
Presumptions can be made in criminal cases. In the 
case of State v. Kennedy, Iowa , 224 N.W.2d 223 
(1974), the court upheld a conviction of tampering w~th 
the odometer merely by showing the defendant was the owner 
of the vehicle and that the odometer was changed (no showing 
that defendant tampered with the odometer). This was a 
much more serious offense than is a parking meter violation 
and subjected the defendant to far greater penalties. 
A substantial number of cases have concluded that an 
inference of the owner's guilt was justified in parking 
violations as a conunon law rule of evidence even though 
there is no statute or ordinance so provid~ng. In People v. 
Rubin, 284 N.Y. 392, 31 N.E.2d 501 (1940), the New York 
Court of Appeals stated: 
"The contrary is urged because there was no 
direct proof that the stationing of the car in 
violation of the ordinance was done by the de-
fendant. To rule that this inference may not 
-5-
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be drawn from the established facts would be to 
deny to the trier of the facts the right to use 
a common process of reasoning ...• If he was 
not in control he could easily have produced 
a witness or witnesses to show it. (Citations 
omitted) We find it competent under the circum-
stances to conclude from the proof that the owner 
of the car controlled the car and personally 
violated the regulation." 
See also, People v. Lang, 106 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1951),· co ~-
wealth v. Ober, 286 Mass. 25, 189 N.E. 601 (1934); Chicago v. 
Crane, 319 Ill. App. 623, 49 N.E.2d 802 (1943). 
The Supreme Court of Bhode Island came to the same 
conclusion in the case of State v. Morgan, 72 R.I. 101, 
48 A.2d 248 (1946). Therein the court stated: 
"It was agreed by the parties that the sole 
issue was the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support the conclusion that the defendant had 
parked or allowed the automobile to be parked 
in violation of law. The decisive question 
therefore is whether, in the absence of any 
rule of evidence appearing in the enabling 
statute or municipal traffic regulations, the 
mere proof of the registration of the auto-
mobile in defendant's name, without more, is 
enough to support an inference that hehad 
parked or allowed the automobile to be so 
parked, and to sustain a conviction if such 
inference is not explained or refuted by other 
evidence. 
" the defendant's exception cannot 
be sustained, and therefore the decision of 
the superior court finding the defendant 
guilty stands." 
In another New York case, wherein the defendant appealed 
the finding of guilty and the imposition of a $5.00 fine foc 
illegal parking, the court said: 
-6-
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"If this judgment is to be sustained, it is 
necessary for us to hold that the proved fact 
of the ownership of the automobile by the appellant 
raises the presumption that the car was under 
the control of the appellant, and that therefore 
he is responsible for having violated the provi-
sions of the ordinance against illegal parking. 
Without this presumption no prima facie case has 
been made out." People v. Marchetti, 154 Misc. 
147, 276 N.Y.S. 708 (1934). 
The court held the presumption rule applies. After dis-
cussion of various applications of the presumption rule in 
related areas, the court held, 
"Granting that mere ownership of an automobile 
is not evidence of exclusive control, still it 
is well within the owners power to produce evi-
dence as to who was or was not in control, evidence 
which the people are in most cases unable to pre-
sent. 
"I hold, therefore, in this case, given evidence 
of ownership and illegal parking, the prosecution 
may rest their case upon a presumption of guilt, 
making it incumbent upon the defendant to produce 
evidence that would negative this presumption. 
Presumptions need not always be provided for by 
statute, as conclusively appears from the cases 
above cited and numerous others." Id. at p. 711. 
The court, in People v. Johnson, 228 N.Y.S.2d 527 (1962), 
commented on the presumption rule and said: 
"Where a motor vehicle is registered in the 
name of a particular owner, a presumption is 
created that the owner is the person who violated 
the parking ordinance, and the burden is placed 
upon the owner to offer proof that he was not 
in possession or control of the vehicle. This 
principle does not change the law as to the 
presumption of innocence, but merely shifts the 
burden of going forward from the people to the 
defendant." 
-7-
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The only case which this writer found wherein 
the court 
refused to apply the presumption rule in a parking 
violation 
matter is State v. Scoggin, 236 N.C. 19, 72 S.E.2d 54 (1952). , 
While the court recognized the desirability of such a 
rule, 
it declined to give rise to such a presumption in the 
absence of a statute or ordinance authorizing its use. The 
court refused to apply the presumption because the prev~us 
session of the state legislature had rejected a bill on such 
a presumption. 
CONCLUSION 
Because of the peculiar nature of parking violations, 
parking tickets would be useless unless the City also has 
a practical means of enforcement and this is a presumption 
rule of evidence inferring that the owner was the one 
committing the violation. Since the owner is the one with 
the best knowledge, he can easily refute the inference if 
he was not the violator. In order to balance the rights 
of the people as a whole against the individual rights, it 
is not unreasonable to allow the court to use common sense 
of mankind to give weight to such an inference. The rule 
does not relieve the prosecution of the burden of proof, 
but merely shifts the burden of proof to the defendant. 
There is a common law presumption rule in effect, that is, 
as Justice Crockett stated in his dissenting opinion in the 
-8-
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case of Nasfell v. Ogden City, 122 Ut. 344, 249 P.2d 507 
(1952), p. 513, "to infer that the owner parked his auto-
mobile or was responsible for doing so." 
rt is urgent that this Court rule that there is a 
presumption rule of evidence as herein stated and remand 
this case to the District Court with such instructions. 
Respectfully submitted, 
0. WALLACE EARL 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
101 City & County Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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